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Abstract Embedded devices need both an efficient and a secure implementation of
cryptographic primitives. In this chapter we show how common signal processing
techniques are used in order to achieve both objectives. Regarding efficiency, we
first give an example of accelerating hash function primitives using the retiming
transformation, a well known technique to improve signal processing applications.
Second, we outline the use of some special features of DSP processors and tech-
niques earlier developed for efficient implementations of public-key algorithms.
Regarding the secure implementations we outline the concept of side channel at-
tacks and show how a multitude of techniques for preprocessing the data are used
in such scenarios. Finally, we talk about fuzzy secrets and point out the use of DSP
techniques for an important role in cryptography — a key derivation.
1 Introduction
The implementation of cryptographic and security applications has adapted tech-
niques more than expected from the architectures, design methods and tools of sig-
nal processing systems. When implementing cryptographic applications on embed-
ded devices, in hardware, software or a combination of both, there are two opti-
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mization goals. The first request is one of efficiency: the implementations should
be efficient in area, time, power consumption etc. This is very similar to the im-
plementation of signal processing applications. The other requirement is one of a
secure implementation. Implementations should not leak information. Signal pro-
cessing techniques are used for both. As research progresses, signal processing and
cryptography find more overlaps.
In this chapter, an overview is given of the use of signal processing techniques
as they are used for efficient implementations as well as used for the analysis of
secure implementations. The techniques that are used for efficient implementations
in particular, are discussed in more detail in Chapter ?? and Chapter ??.
Section 2 gives an overview of efficient implementations for both secret-key and
public-key. It describes techniques borrowed from fast filter implementations to op-
timize the implementation of hash functions. It also describes implementations of
public-key on DSP processors. Section 3 focuses on secure implementations and
the signal processing techniques used in analysis. Section 4 discusses the usage of
signal processing techniques for fuzzy secrets. Section 5 gives the conclusion and
describes some new trends.
2 Efficient Implementation
2.1 Secret-Key Algorithms and Implementations
2.1.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions and Implementations
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic algorithm that takes input strings
— M of arbitrary length and returns short fixed-length strings, so called message
digests — Hash(M), and it is required to satisfy the following cryptographic prop-
erties:
1. Preimage resistance: It must be infeasible to find any preimage, M, for a given
hash output, H, such that H=Hash(M).
2. Second Preimage resistance: It must be infeasible to find another preimage, M1,
for a given input, M0, such that Hash(M0)=Hash(M1).
3. Collision resistance: It must be infeasible to find two different inputs of the same
hash output, M0 and M1, such that Hash(M0)=Hash(M1).
To be useful in applications such as Digital Signature Algorithm and message
authentications, the performance becomes an important factor since inputs are easily
large. To obtain architectures with a better performance, a design methodology is
developed in [42] based on theoretically proven signal processing techniques [56].
Here we illustrate this methodology with the example of MD6, which was one of the
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SHA-3 candidates1 [13]. Chapter ?? provides more detailed analysis of the common
DSP techniques used in this example.
First, we derive a DFG (Data Flow Graph) of MD6 as shown in Fig. 1. This DFG
represents one iteration of the algorithm, where the square nodes are registers and
each register is paired with an algorithmic delay (D) so that the register values can
be updated on each cycle. The circle nodes are functional nodes where ∧ denotes the
bitwise “AND” operator, ⊕: the bitwise “XOR” operator, ≪ b: left-shifted by b bits
(zero shifting in), and ≫ b: right-shifted by b bits (zero shifting in). Si is constant,
but changes from round to round. Each round is composed of 13 iterations and the
number of rounds depends on the algorithm parameters.
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Fig. 1 MD6 DFG — Critical Path
The critical path delay can be measured as the maximum delay among any two
consecutive algorithmic delays (D’s), which for MD6 consists of 6 XOR delays as
shown in Fig. 1 (indicated by an arrow with a dotted line). Before applying some
techniques to minimize the critical path delay, we first need to know how much we
can achieve. This can be done by analyzing the iteration bound of a DFG, which
defines a theoretical lower bound of the achievable critical path delay as defined by
the following equation:
T∞ = max
l∈L
{
tl
wl
}
=
4×Delay(⊕)+Delay(∧)
18 (1)
where tl is the loop calculation time, wl is the number of algorithmic delays in the l-
th loop, and L is the set of all possible loops. The iteration bound of MD6 is defined
with the loop indicated by a thick dotted line in Fig. 1.
In order to achieve a critical path delay as the iteration bound, it requires the
unfolding transformation with the factor of the un-canceled denominator, which is
18 in this case. This introduces an overhead by duplicating the functional nodes (18
times duplication). Therefore, we choose not to perform the unfolding transforma-
tion but perform retiming transformation only. The achievable critical path delay
only with the retiming transformation can be defined as follows:
1 SHA-3 competition, organized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is
a worldwide competition for the development of a new hash standard.
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Fig. 2 MD6 DFG — Retiming Transformation
⌈T∞⌉=
⌈
4×Delay(⊕)+Delay(∧)
18
⌉
= Prop(⊕) (2)
⌈·⌉ is the maximum part when 4×Delay(⊕) + Delay(∧) is evenly distributed
into 18 parts. Since it is assumed that a functional node can not be split into mul-
tiple parts in the iteration bound analysis, ⊕ cannot be further split. By retiming
transformations, we replace the algorithmic delays (D’s) in order to reduce the crit-
ical path delay. Some of the algorithmic delays between registers (including those
in the abbreviated area) can be moved to proper positions as shown in Fig. 2 where
the new critical path delay is Prop(⊕). The details about retiming transformations
and implementation issues can be found in [42] [56]. It shows that techniques which
were originally developed for improving the throughput of digital filters with feed-
back can be also applied to hash function implementations. For more information
about hardware design for cryptographic hash function we refer the reader to [43].
In the light of the running SHA-3 competition, an extensive hardware evaluation
of the competing algorithms has been performed by the research community. One
of the examples is the work of Sharif et al. [62], which specifically explores the
influence of the embedded FPGA resources (such as DSP units) on hardware per-
formance of the five SHA-3 finalists. Due to the presence of addition operation in
their compression functions, two out of five candidates as well as the current SHA-2
standard benefit from using the DSP units. Since addition is a relatively simple op-
eration, the benefit is more reflected in reducing the usage of other resources rather
than increasing the overall throughput.
2.2 Public-Key Algorithms and Implementations
2.2.1 Efficient Modular Multiplication
Public-key cryptography (PKC), a concept introduced by Diffie and Hellman [15]
in the mid 70’s, has gained its popularity together with the rapid evolution of to-
day’s digital communication systems. The best-known public-key cryptosystems
are based on factoring i.e. RSA [60] and on the discrete logarithm problem in a
large prime field (Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal, Schnorr, DSA) [48] or on an ellip-
tic/hyperelliptic curve (ECC/HECC) [38] [51] [39]. Based on the hardness of the
underlying mathematical problem, PKC usually deals with large numbers ranging
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from a few hundreds to a few thousands of bits in size. Consequently, the efficient
implementations of the PKC primitives has always been a challenge.
An efficient implementation of the mentioned cryptosystems highly depends on
the efficient implementation of modular arithmetic. Namely, modular multiplication
forms the basis of modular exponentiation which is the core operation of the RSA
cryptosystem. It is also present in many other cryptographic algorithms including
those based on ECC and HECC. In particular, if one uses projective coordinates for
ECC/HECC, modular multiplication remains the most time consuming operation
for ECC. Hence, an efficient implementation of PKC relies on efficient modular
multiplication.
Two algorithms for modular multiplication, namely Barrett [4] and Montgomery [52]
algorithms are widely used today. Both algorithms avoid multiple-precision divi-
sions, the operation that is considered to be expensive, especially in hardware.
Implemented on a first generation of DSP produced by Texas Instruments (TMS
32010), the Barrett’s algorithm is one of the famous examples in the area of signal
processing for cryptography. The properties of a DSP such as fast multiply and ac-
cumulate (MAC) operation and a fast microprocessor on a single chip seemed to be
an ideal combination for the proposed algorithm. Furthermore, additional speed-ups
were obtained by taking advantage of a feature of the TMS320 DSP which allowed
auto increment and decrement of data pointers during MAC operations. This en-
sured the data fetching for free. The original Barrett reduction algorithms is given
in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1 Barrett modular reduction.
Input: A = (A2n−1 . . .A0)2, M = (Mn−1 . . .M0)2 where Mn−1 6= 0, µ =
⌊
22n/M
⌋
.
Output: R = A mod M.
ˆQ⇐
⌊⌊ A
2n−1
⌋
µ
2n+1
⌋
R⇐ A mod 2n+1− ˆQM mod 2n+1
while R≥M do
R⇐ R−M
end while
return R.
Montgomery’s algorithm is the most commonly used reduction algorithm, nowa-
days. It is widely used to speed up the modular multiplications and squarings re-
quired during the exponentiation process. The Montgomery reduction algorithm
computes T = A · r−1 mod M, given A < M2 and r such that gcd(r,M) = 1. Even
though the algorithm works with any r, relatively prime to M, r is very often cho-
sen to be a power of 2. In that case, the Montgomery algorithm performs integer
divisions by a power of 2, which is an intrinsically fast operation on both general-
purpose and specialized processors. The algorithm is given in Alg. 2.
There is a number of publications reporting the implementations of Mont-
gomery’s algorithm on a DSP. One of the first reported results was a work of Michael
Wiener who had developed a general software implementation of RSA on the Mo-
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Algorithm 2 Montgomery modular reduction.
Input: A = (A2n−1 . . .A0)2, M = (Mn−1 . . .M0)2, r = 2n where gcd(M,2) = 1, M′ =−M−1 mod r.
Output: T = Ar−1 mod M.
S ⇐ (A mod r)M′ mod r
T ⇐ (A+SM)/r
if T ≥M then
T ⇐ T −M
end if
return T .
torola DSP56000 that achieved 10.2 Kbps for 512-bit modular exponentiation with
the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) [7]. Dusse and Kaliski have published an
RSA implementation on the same chip achieving 11.6 Kbps for 512-bit modular
exponentiation with the CRT [17]. They adopted the Montgomery’s algorithm by
reducing the number of shift operations. Since on many processors the “high part”
and the “low part” of accumulators are separately addressable, the shift operations
have to be performed with move instructions. This was also true for the DSP56000
and the idea of reducing the number of shifts turned out to be a very good approach.
Itoh et al. proposed a fast implementation method of Montgomery multiplication
on a DSP TMS320C6201 [34]. This DSP operates eight function units in paral-
lel achieving a performance of 11.7 ms for 1024-bit RSA signing (87.5 Kbps). In
2004, Großscha¨dl et al. [27] analyzed the performance of Montgomery multipli-
cation on the MIPS32 4Km and the ARM 946E-S processors. In particular, they
explored the suitability of the DSP architectural enhancements to speed up multiple-
precision modular multiplication. Recently, Gastaldo et al. [22] have published an
enhanced Montgomery multiplication algorithm, a variant of the finely integrated
product scanning (FIPS) algorithm, that is targeted to digital signal processors. More
about various approaches for implementing Montgomery’s algorithm on a DSP can
be found in [10].
2.2.2 Implementations of Public-Key algorithms
There are several implementations reported in the literature describing efficient PK
cryptosystems on DSP architectures, mainly relying on the algorithm of Mont-
gomery. For RSA cryptosystems, modular multiplication is practically the only re-
quired operation. As it is commonly implemented as a sequence of repeated squar-
ings and multiplications, some authors explored possible speed-ups that can be
achieved for a dedicated squaring. Krishnamurthy et al. proposed a new method
for the Montgomery squaring reduction especially suited for DSP processors. The
new method restructures the loop in the squaring reduction and when implemented
on the TI TMS320C6201 DSP platform results in speed-ups of 10-15 % compared
to the previous work in [34]. The results are obtained by removing the redundancy
of previous proposals and by maximizing the feature of pipelining as much as the
platform permits.
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Guajardo et al. [28] described a strategy for an efficient implementation of ECC
over GF(p) on the 16-bit TI MSP430x33x family. This family of devices is com-
monly used for ultra-low power applications such as electronic meters for gas, water
and electricity and also for sensor systems that collect analogue signals. The signal
are converted to digital ones before being transmitted to a host. The properties make
the platform very suitable for embedded security applications.
The authors use a Generalized-Merssenne prime to facilitate the underlying field
arithmetic. The operations i.e. multiplication, squaring and modular reduction are
adapted to explore the specifics of the architecture. For example, multiplications
with small constants were traded for additions as the ratio of multiplication and ad-
dition is around 10 on this processor. Also, squaring was found to be much faster
when implemented as a special routine because the communication with data mem-
ory was reduced (requiring only one input in this case). The use of a special prime,
as suggested by standards, was additionally tailored to the 16-bit architecture. How-
ever, all the tricks used were not enough to meet the requirements for the 160-bit
security level (as required minimum for ECC key lengths). Therefore, they propose
to use 128-bit EC implementations as sufficient for the targeted applications.
We note here that implementing squaring in a different manner from general mul-
tiplication is found to be sensitive to side-channel attacks (see Sect. 3). Therefore,
the ideas of dedicated squaring are abandoned for embedded applications.
By extensive use of the DSP blocks on Xilinx’s Virtex-4 SX55 FPGA board,
Gu¨neysu and Paar [31] report the fastest point multiplication on commercially avail-
able FPGA platforms. Their implementation performs more than 24,000 and 37,000
point multiplications per second for ECC over the NIST P-256 and P-224 fields,
respectively.
Morozov et al. [53] investigate the design space of ECC implementation on Texas
Instruments’ OMAP 3530 platform (accommodating the ARM Cortex A8 core),
specifically considering its DSP core for accelerating the underlying modular arith-
metic. A speedup of more than 9 times is achieved, compared to the implementation
executing on the ARM Cortex processor only.
2.2.3 Other Ideas for Arithmetic Borrowed from Signal Processing
Cryptographic application as well as signal processing require arithmetic-intensive
operations, hence there are several ideas that were applied in both. Examples include
Residue Number System (RNS) arithmetic [63], signed-digit arithmetic, computa-
tion in frequency domain etc.
Nowadays ever faster arithmetic is demanded e.g. for RSA cryptosystems due
to the constant improvements in factoring and the resulting requirements for even
longer key sizes. In order to achieve that, the Residue Number System is an alter-
native to the common radix representation. RNS arithmetic is a very old idea which
relies on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and it provides a good means for
very long integer arithmetic.
Let 〈x〉a denote an RNS representation of x, then:
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〈x〉a = (x[a1],x[a2], . . . ,x[an]) (3)
where, x[ai] = xmodai. The set a = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} is called a base (of size n). It is
required that gcd(ai,a j) = 1 for i 6= j. CRT implies that the integer x which satisfies
0≤ x < ∏ni=1 ai is uniquely represented by 〈x〉a.
A well known advantage of RNS is that to add, subtract and multiply such num-
bers we only need to compute the addition, subtraction and multiplication of their
components, of size much smaller than the original modulus. Also carry-free arith-
metic makes parallelization possible. The final result is obtained by means of the
CRT. The disadvantage of an RNS representation is the overhead introduced by the
input and output conversions from binary to RNS and vice versa. It is also difficult to
perform division. To overcome this disadvantage, a combination with Montgomery
multiplication was proposed [58]. Recent results show that RNS Montgomery brings
a higher speed for both ECC and Pairing implementations on FPGAs [30] [12].
Exponent recoding techniques for modular exponentiation (as used for RSA)
replace the binary representation of an exponent with a representation which has
fewer non-zero terms (see Gollmann et al. [26]). Many techniques for exponent
recoding have been proposed in the literature. Here we mention the signed-digit
representation. Consider an integer representation of the form k = ∑li=0 si2i, where
si ∈ {−1,0,1}. This is called the (binary) signed digit (SD) representation (see
Menezes et al. [48]). The representation is redundant. For example, the integer 3
can be represented as (011)2 or (10¯1)2, where ¯1 = −1. It is said that an SD repre-
sentation is sparse if it has no adjacent non-zero digits. A sparse SD representation
is also called a non-adjacent form (NAF). Every integer k has a unique NAF which
has the minimum weight of any signed digit representation of k.
For RSA, the NAF techniques are not beneficial because they assume perform-
ing the division operation, which should be avoided due to the complexity of the
operation. However, for ECC it is considered advantageous because the Hamming
weight of the scalar is minimal. Also in this case “-1” means point subtraction in-
stead of addition, which is an addition of the inverse point. More precisely, the
scalar is decomposed as a NAF and the scalar multiplication is done with a series of
addition/subtractions of elliptic curve points.
Other redundancy-based techniques include on-line arithmetic as proposed by
Ercegovac [18]. In particular on-line arithmetic for DSP applications can be found
in [19].
ECC implementation in the frequency domain is given by Baktir et al. [2]. The
work is based on Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) modular multiplication and ECC
processor architecture using the multiplier is presented. In this way multiplication
in GF(qm) is achieved by only a linear number of base field GF(q) multiplications
in addition to a quadratic number of simpler base field operations such as addi-
tions/subtractions and bitwise rotations.
An idea for implementation of large integer multiplication in the discrete Fourier
domain originates from Kalach and David [36].
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2.3 Architecture
The architecture design of cryptographic systems requires special considerations on
performance, cost and security. Many cryptographic systems, especially public-key
cryptosystems, involve complex operations with large integers or long polynomials.
Thus, cryptographic co-processors, just like accelerators for multimedia, commu-
nication or image processing, are introduced to offload the heavy processes from
CPU. As a result, a Hardware/Software (HW/SW) co-design approach is usually
used. Both the co-processor and the interface need to be carefully designed such
that the co-processor can efficiently offload the work from CPU while security and
flexibility are maintained. We illustrate the idea with an Elliptic Curve Processor.
2.3.1 Datapath
Datapath normally accounts for a large percentage of the total area and is a deter-
minative factor of the performance. Taking ECC over GF(p) as an example, each
scalar point multiplication involves hundreds of modular multiplications. As a re-
sult, speeding up the modular multiplication is the key to improve the overall perfor-
mance. The multiplier can be implemented in a bit-parallel, digit-parallel or digit-
serial way. When using digit-serial multiplier, the area of the datapath can be by
adjusted by changing the digit-size. On some FPGA platforms, we can also use the
dedicated multipliers or MACs (e.g. 25-bit MAC on Virtex-5) as building blocks of
a modular multiplier [49] [31].
When targeting high speed applications, an implementation can use multiple dat-
apaths to run several modular multiplications in parallel [61] [20]. The basic idea
is similar to a classical superscalar processor that explores the instruction level par-
allelism. However, such kind of architecture normally requires aggressive memory
accesses, which requires a high throughput memory.
2.3.2 Interface
The interface between the co-processor and CPU is of vital importance, as the
HW/SW partitioning has a large impact on the performance and flexibility. Take
ECC as an example, one can immediately see the following three choices, as shown
in Fig. 3.
When choosing PL as the partitioning point, the co-processor performs the mod-
ular arithmetic while the CPU generates instruction sequences for point addi-
tion/doubling and all functions above. This choice is offers a very good flexibility.
On the other side, the CPU has to frequently transfer data and instructions to the
co-processor, which may become a bottleneck. If we choose PH as the partitioning
point, then the CPU only needs to send the data at the very beginning of a scalar
multiplication, and substantially reduces the communication overhead. However, it
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Fig. 3 Hardware/Software co-design for ECC.
is difficult to update the scalar multiplication algorithm since it is now implemented
in hardware.
Being able to update the functionality of an cryptographic implementation is
very important as standards may change or the old algorithm is no longer safe due
to the discovery of new attacks. For example, when new side-channel attacks are
founded, corresponding countermeasures need to be added. Thus, the co-processor
should have a certain degree of programmability. One method to achieve low com-
munication overhead and high flexibility is to introduce control hierarchy. Instead
of fixed state machine (FSM), a programmable micro-controller can be used in the
co-processor.
2.3.3 Low Power Architecture
When using cryptography in constrained devices, i.e. passive RFID tags and wire-
less sensor nodes, power consumption becomes a big challenge. Several low power
architectures [44] [32] for ECC have been proposed. Traditional techniques such as
reducing the hardware size, lowering the clock frequency and using clock-gating are
helpful. For ECC implementations, registers account for more than 60% of the area
and most of the dynamic power. Thus, reducing the size of register file and register
flipping can significantly reduce the power consumption.
3 Secure Implementations: Side Channel Attacks
Cryptographic algorithms, i.e. mathematical objects describing the input-output be-
havior of a black box, have to go through a thorough process of cryptanalysis before
they are widely accepted as secure and possibly standardized. Implementations of
cryptographic algorithms essentially instantiate these black boxes.
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An implementation of an algorithm does however not automatically inherit the
algorithm’s security. The fact that the abstract black box is implemented in soft-
ware, hardware, or a combination of both gives rise to new security risks. Indeed,
measurable physical properties of an implementation become an additional, unin-
tended source of information, giving away knowledge about the secrets involved in
cryptographic implementations. Those sources are called side channels. While the
execution time of an implementation can be measured even from a distance, e.g.
over a network, the physical accessibility of embedded devices in particular gives
rise to even more side channels such as the power consumption, electromagnetic
radiation, acoustics, heat dissipation, light emission, etc.
Cryptanalytical methods exploiting such information leakage to extract secret
data are called side channel attacks. Side channel attacks are a serious concern as
they allow to extract secret information from unprotected implementations of black
box secure algorithms with moderate effort. With the ever increasing availability and
ubiquity of embedded devices, side channel attacks are a realistic threat nowadays.
One type of side channel attacks, a differential side channel attack, sequences
several steps to extract the secret information. In a first stage the attacker collects
measurements of the side channel, e.g. power consumption, as a function of the
time. Each measurement is the physical representation of the execution of the cryp-
tographic algorithm with a different message but a fixed key. In a second stage,
the attacker preprocesses the data, chooses a hypothetical power leakage model and
calculates the hypothetical leakage using this model for each message and for every
possible key guess. An example of one such model is the hamming weight of the
processed data at a certain time instant. In this case an adversary assumes that the
amplitude of the side channel measurement is related to the amount of binary ones
in the data. The validity of this model in certain cases is demonstrated in Fig. 4. In
1 2 3 4 5 6
Time [clock cycles]
Su
pp
ly 
cu
rre
nt
Fig. 4 Measurements of supply current over time. Data dependent operations in clock cycles three
and four leak information about the operand(s).
the last phase of the attack, the attacker uses a statistical test to quantify the similar-
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ity between the hypothetical leakage and the real side channel leakage for every key
guess. The key that reveals the strongest relation is the adversary’s best guess.
3.1 DSP Techniques Used in Side Channel Analysis
The side channel analysis research domain has become a mature research area over
the last decade, hence a multitude of techniques for preprocessing the data and quan-
tifying the relation between the real and hypothetical leakage have been proposed.
The measurements of the side channel are susceptible to external and internal
noise contamination. Therefore, a first group of preprocessing techniques aims at
reducing the amplitude noise. The easiest preprocessing technique is averaging the
measurements. This was first pointed out by Kocher et al. in [40]. More noise re-
duction can be achieved through filtering the data [3]. Results have been published
for the power side channel [50] as well as for the electromagnetic side channel [1].
Another, more recently proposed technique is calculating the fourth-order cumu-
lant [41]. In some cases, the useful information is modulated onto a carrier. For this
type of data extraction, demodulation techniques are appropriate [1] [37] [55].
Due to clock jitter, absence of a suitable trigger or simply due to countermea-
sures, measurements can suffer from temporal misalignment. Some publications
deal with this problem and try to remove the temporal misalignment. Homma et
al. explain the phase-based waveform matching procedure [33] and Gebotys and
White introduce the phase replacement technique [24]. Pelletier and Charvet use
wavelets to get rid of misalignment [57]. The rapid alignment method [54] of Mui-
jrers et al. also builds on wavelets. Woudenberg et al. propose to use dynamic time
warping [64].
In the final phase of a side channel attack, the attacker uses a statistical tool to
find the correct key by analyzing the relation between the hypothetical leakage and
the measured leakage. The difference of means test was proposed by Kocher et al.
in their seminal paper [40]. Later, more advanced techniques were put forward: the
T-test [14], the Pearson correlation coefficient [8], Spearman rank correlation [5],
mutual information [25], and maximum likelihood [11]. While all the previous tech-
niques are applied in the time domain, the differential frequency analysis exploits
the frequency information [23].
Advanced signal processing techniques strengthen the adversary’s capabilities
and raise the need for proper and better countermeasures against side channel at-
tacks.
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4 Working with Fuzzy Secrets
4.1 Fuzzy Secrets: Properties and Applications in Cryptography
Secrets play an important role in cryptography, since the alleged security of many
cryptographic schemes is solely based on the assumed confidentiality of certain data,
mostly called a key. In order for a secret key to be secure, it needs to be hard for an
adversary to guess its value. Keys are mostly represented as digital n bit strings and
when they are sampled uniformly at random from {0,1}n, an adversary can only
guess their value with probability 2−n, which becomes negligibly small when n is
chosen large enough. Also, a cryptographic algorithm should only succeed when
the correct key is applied, and fail when even the slightest bit is changed, in order
to prevent an adversary from guessing close keys, which is easier than 2−n. This
means that secret keys cannot be subject to any kind of noise or distortion.
In a number of security applications, secret data is present, but not in the form of
a uniformly distributed and noise-free binary key string. This is often the case when
the secret stems from a physical phenomenon which is mostly analogue in nature,
not uniformly distributed and subject to random noise. Such data is called a fuzzy
secret. Some examples of cryptographic settings involving fuzzy secrets are listed
below:
• Biometric readings such as fingerprints, iris scans, face structure and voice pat-
terns are believed to be unique to each human being and can hence serve as
a unique, and possible secret, identifier. To obtain digital data from these read-
ings, a feature extraction process is necessary. However, the extracted features are
most likely not uniformly distributed and some features are measured differently
at consecutive readings, i.e. they are subject to measurement noise. Extracted
biometrical features can hence not be directly used as a cryptographic key.
• Physically unclonable functions [47] or PUFs are cryptographic hardware primi-
tives that fulfill a function similar to biometrics, i.e. they measure unique physical
properties of their embedding device. Interesting constructions of PUFs are those
that are embedded into integrated circuits, since they allow to generate device-
unique and highly protected chip identifiers [29] [21]. The uniqueness of every
chip stems from uncontrollable nano-scale manufacturing variability in the pro-
duction process of the circuits. Like biometrics, PUF responses suffer from a
non-uniform distribution and unreliability due to measurement inaccuracy and
random thermal noise in the electrical measurement circuits.
More settings involving fuzzy secrets exist, e.g. in authentication with long pass-
phrases and in quantum key agreement.
The non-uniformity and the noise of a fuzzy secret can be quantified. Information
entropy is commonly used to describe the uncertainty about a random variable. A
special case of entropy called min-entropy describes the worst case uncertainty, i.e.
it evaluates the best chances an adversary has in guessing a secret value chosen
from a known distribution. The min-entropy of a random variable X is denoted as
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H∞(X) and defined as H∞(X)
de f
= − log2 maxx Pr[X = x]. A uniformly distributed
n-bit variable has maximal min-entropy equal to n, while a deterministic value has
min-entropy zero. To describe the noise, it is assumed that the measured fuzzy secret
X is a bit vector of length n. Two distinct observations of the fuzzy secret possibly
differ in a number of bit locations due to noise. The amplitude of the noise affecting
X can be quantified by the maximum number δ (X) of differing bits between two
measurements.
4.2 Generating Cryptographic Keys from Fuzzy Secrets by means
of Error Correction
Mostly, a physical variable cannot be directly used. It should first be measured as
accurately as possible and afterwards quantized into a discrete value which can be
used by a digital algorithm. The quantization process translates physical noise into
bit errors of a bit vector. Also, due to rounding, part of the information in the mea-
sured value is already lost. A careful choice for quantization should be made to
optimize these parameters given the implementation constraints.
After measurement and quantization, one is left with a possibly non-uniform
and unreliable bit string X ∈ {0,1}n. By performing multiple measurements, the
aforementioned parameters H∞(X) and δ (X) can be estimated. The next step in the
transformation is dealing with the noise which can introduce up to δ (X) bit errors.
Error correction techniques are frequently used in channel coding theory. A process
known as the code-offset construction [35] [16] [45] is an elegant way of using error
correcting block codes in order to get rid of bit errors in a measurement of X . The
technique works in two phases:
1. In the generation phase, X is measured and a codeword C is randomly selected
from an [n,k, t]-block code, with n the code length, k the code dimension and t
the error correcting capability. The binary offset between X and C ia calculated
as W = X ⊕C and W is made publicly available, e.g. it is published in an online
database.
2. In the reproduction phase, X ′ is measured which can differ from X in up to δ (X)
bit positions. Using the publicly available W , one can calculate C′ = X ′⊕W ,
which differs from C in at most δ (X) bits. If the used code is chosen appro-
priately such that t ≥ δ (X), the decoding algorithm will succeed to compute
C = Decode(C′). In that case the same X as in the generation phase can be
reconstructed as X = C⊕W .
More elaborate error-correction techniques can be applied to transform a noisy mea-
surement value into a reliable bit string. In the syndrome construction [16] the syn-
drome, instead of the offset, of a linear block code is used, which reduces the com-
munication overhead. In [46], it is shown that certain fuzzy secrets produce soft-
decision information, which allows the use of soft-decision error-correcting tech-
Signal Processing for Cryptography and Security Applications 15
niques. This allows to extract a longer and hence more secure key from the same
fuzzy secret.
All these techniques uses a public communication to establish a noise-free secret
from a noisy secret. The data that is passed through this channel, W is called helper
data. It is clear that the publishing of W decreases the uncertainty an adversary may
have about the value of X . In fact, for the code-offset construction it can be shown
that the min-entropy of X is reduced from H∞(X) to H∞(X)− n + k, i.e. that the
helper data induces a min-entropy loss.
To conclude, the now noise-free secret with limited min-entropy needs to be
transformed into a uniformly distributed key K. In order to do this, randomness
extractors are used. Randomness extractors succeed in extracting uniform random-
ness from non-uniformly distributed variables [9] [6]. It is obvious that the output
domain of a randomness extractor is smaller than the input, hence they are com-
pression functions. In fact, the min-entropy of a random variable X is a measure
for the maximum number of uniform bits an ideal randomness extractor can extract
from X . After error correction with the code-offset technique, the fuzzy secret X
can hence contribute at most H∞(X)− n + k uniformly random bits. Generic ran-
domness extractors can be constructed relatively easy by using so-called universal
hash functions: if H is a universal hash family, the process that selects a random
function hσ ← H and calculates K = hσ (X) is a randomness extractor. The seed
σ can again be published as helper data to allow reconstruction of K at later times,
this time however without additional loss in min-entropy.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the usage of signal processing techniques
into the design and implementation of cryptographic and security applications. This
is only the beginning and by no means complete. New directions are being explored.
One example is the exploration of signal processing in the encrypted domain, which
is the topic of the SPEED project [59].
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